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ABSTRACT
"United Against Apartheid: The South African Communist Party and the African
National Congress, 1917-1963" explores the path taken by the South African Communist
Party towards forging an alliance with the African National Congress in order to topple
the Nationalist Party's apartheid regime. It examines the ideological changes experienced
by the Communist Party while adapting to the South African context, and how these
changes influenced the Communist Party's relationship with the African National
Congress.
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Introduction

1910 saw the creation of the Union of South Africa as a modem twentieth century
state. The British and Afrikaner white minority created a system of class and racial super
exploitation of the black majority through the enactment of segregationist policies. 1 The
elections of 1948 increased and entrenched racial segregation in the Republic of South
Africa.2 It is within this oppressive context that the Communist Party of South Africa
(CPSA) operated in direct opposition to the state and its exploitative policies. The CPSA
was one of the earliest enemies of South Africa's ruling British and Afrikaner political
establishment. 3 This essay will focus on the CPSA' s ideological shift as it sought to
establish an alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) in order to overthrow the
Nationalist Party and its apartheid regime. The time frame covered will begin with the
rise of communism in 1917, and it will end in 1963 when the Nationalist government
weakened the ANC and CPSA's presence in South Africa. 4 The events that took place
during these years were paramount to cementing the ANC/CPSA alliance.
It is interesting that the ANC and the CPSA managed to cooperate in an efficient
manner despite having somewhat of a conflicting ideology. The CPSA viewed South
Africa's problems from a class perspective, while the ANC believed these problems were

1

Afrikaner is the Boer name for African . As I will show later, Boers are the descendants of Dutch colonists.
Throughout this paper I will use Afrikaner and Boer interchangeably when referring to these Dutch
descendants. The term Black in South Africa encompasses different identity group-s. It is comprised of
African, Indian, and Coloured groups. When only referring to the native people of South Africa, I will use
the term African.
2

Thomas G. Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter,
1983), www.jsto r. org (accessed 22 January 2014), 381.

3

Ibid.

4

A. Lerumo, "Fighting Back Against Apartheid," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London : lnkululeko
I

Publications, 1971), 108.

1

•

caused by racial conflict. Despite their ideological differences, the two organizations
managed to reach common ground and form a close alliance to overthrow the Nationalist
state. Two key figures in this alliance were the ANC's Nelson Mandela and the CPSA's
Joe Slovo. Both men shared command of Umkhonto we Sizwe, also known as MK,
which was the military wing of the ANC/CPSA alliance. 5 Commenting on the somewhat
improbable alliance between the ANC and the Communist Party, Mandela made the
following statement: "I was prepared to use whatever means to speed up the erasure of
human prejudict,; and the end of chauvinistic and violent nationalism. I did not need to
become a Communist in order to work with them." 6 Slovo remarked: "The leading
African comrades, began to devote energy as never before to the broad Congress
movement. It was in the 1950s that the real foundation was laid of an alliance between
the Party and the ANC that Oliver Tambo has described as constituting the two pillars of
our liberation struggle." 7 When the Communist Party became illegal in 1950, it ceased to
be a relevant political movement in South Africa. By working with the ANC, which
represented the majority of South Africans, the CPSA remained a relevant factor in the
liberation movement. Through its alliance with the ANC, the CPSA accepted that
African national liberation was centered on issues of race and not on class conflict. I
argue that for the Communist Party to have forged an alliance with the ANC, serious
ideological changes were made to accommodate their new ally's agenda, which
positioned the CPSA in an alliance based on common interests.

5

Karis, "Revolution," 383.

6

Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 121.

7

Joe Slovo, 5/ovo (New York: Ocean Press, 1997), 104.

2

My analysis of the CPSA's alliance with the ANC is based mainly on two
primary sources. The first is Nelson Mandela's autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom,
which offers a wealth of information on the workings of the AN C and its campaigns
against the apartheid regime. The second primary source is Joe Slovo's autobiography,
Slovo, which provides numerous glimpses into the CPSA's battle against the British and
Afrikaner political establishment. The two respective autobiographies also recount the
interactions that the ANC and CPSA had while attempting to form their alliance. As
such, I rely prin arily on Slovo and Mandela's works, as well as evidence from primary
documents released by the Communist Party and found in A. Lemma's Fifty Fighting
Years - a history of the CPSA. Chief Albert Luthuli's autobiography, Let my People Go,
is also briefly examined to provide further insight on the nature of the ANC/CPSA
interaction. All of these sources will be used to provide evidential information to support
my hypothesis.
The historiography regarding the CPSA's interaction with the ANC during their
joint struggle against the South African state has received a fair amount of academic
coverage. From the 1960s onwards, various writers have explored this alliance; however,
most of this literature was written under the shadow of the Cold War. Sources from the
60s, 70s, and 80s tended to be concerned with the level of communist control in the
ANC. However, the end of the Cold War saw a change in the literature, and
interpretations became more nuanced in their analysis of the Communist Party and the
ANC.

An Overview of European Industrialism and the Creation of South Africa
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Communism in South Africa cannot be fully understood without reference to the
industrial revolution in Europe which ultimately led to the creation of the socialist and
communist ideologies. The intensification of industrialism in Great Britain and Western
Europe over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to excessive human
suffering. Some classes of producers became obsolete while others were impoverished as
production assumed a mass scale. As people began to live in increasingly higher
concentrations within major industrial cities, working and living standards plummeted. 8
The ascent of industrialism in Great Britain institutionalized capitalism as the
predominant economic system - an arrangement based on physical and financial assets
revolving around the private ownership of the means of production. 9 The human
suffering brought about by industrialism and capitalism led to the formation of socialism
- an ideology focused on the need to create social justice by providing individuals with
social and economic equality to limit the gap between the rich and the poor.

It is out of the socialist tradition that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels conceived
communism. The two German intellectuals referred to their ideology as scientific
socialism, claiming they could prove scientifically that history had advanced to the point
where socialism would be the new dominant world order. Marx and Engels both argued
that while capitalism was an inevitable stage in human progress, it would ultimately
break down because of its inherent exploitative nature. 10 To Marx and Engels, history
was comprised of the class struggle between various economic and social strata present

8

Alfred G. Meyer, Communism (New York: Random House, 1967), 11.

9

Ernesto Screpanti, "Capitalist Forms and the Essence of Capitalism," Review of International Political
Economy 6 (Spring, 1999), www .jstor .org (accessed 19 May 2013), 1-2.
10

Meyer, Communism, 11-13.

4

in all societies. Communism holds that capitalists (those who own the means of
production) amass their wealth and power through the exploitation of the proletariat
(workers who sell their labour for wages). As the proletariat's misery increases, it will
eventually become aware of its own exploitation and rebel against its capitalist
oppressors, thus resulting in the creation of a utopian communist society. 11
While Europe underwent tremendous changes during the nineteenth century with
the advent of industrialism, the lands that eventually became the Republic of South
Africa experienced their own transformation. In 1652, the Dutch East India Company
established a trading station at the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. It eventually
became the Cape colony, where the Boer (Afrikaner) identity was created. As the
descendants of early Dutch settlers, the Boers grew in number and expanded across
South Africa. In the Cape area, they extended their territory at the cost of the Khoi-khoi
people, who were driven farther inland or enslaved. The Khoi-khoi had mixed with
Portuguese, Polish, Flemish, and German settlers to create the coloured identity group in
the Cape, which eventually fell under Boer and later British domination. 12 In 1795, the
Cape colony rebelled against the Dutch. At the time, Holland was embroiled in the
French Revolutionary Wars and was therefore unable to handle this rebellion. The British
feared the Cape would fall to French control and intervened. The uprising was defeated
and the Cape was subjected to British administration. 13 Living under British rule did not
sit favourably with the Boers. From 1836 to 1854 they launched a massive migration to

11

Andrew Gyorgy, Communism in Perspective (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), 25.

12

Edward S. Ellis, J.H. Aiken, John A. Cooper, John Clark Ridpath, The Story of South Africa (Guelph: World
Publishing Company, 1902), 51-52.

13

Ibid., 57.

5

the outlying territories in what became known as the Great Trek. The Boers sought to
escape British governance and to forcefully expand into new territories. The Boer treks
led to the creation of the republics of Natal, Orange Free State and the Transvaal - also
known as the South African Republic. By 1843, the British gained control of Natal from
the Boers, which doubled their colonial holdings in the area. 14
British and Boer expansion across these territories did not proceed unopposed as
the diverse African inhabitants resisted European encroachment. On the Eastern Cape,
the Xhosa fought the Boers and the British for many decades. They were eventually
defeated in 1818 by British forces, which resulted in the occupation of their lands. 15 In
Natal, the Zulu experienced prolonged fighting with Boer and British forces. They were
defeated in 1887 by the British and their lands were incorporated into Natal. However,
Zulu military resistance continued until it was ultimately defeated in 1906. 16 In the North,
in the lands that became the Orange Free State, the Sotho people were weakened and lost
a great deal of their territory and cattle to Boer wars of aggression from 1865 to 1868.
Nonetheless, the Sotho maintained a degree of independence by agreeing to British
protection; however, these negotiations forced them to cede even more land to the
Europeans. 17
Africans immersed themselves in the colonial world in various ways - one was by
working in the rapidly expanding mines. In 1867, diamond deposits discovered at

14

A. Lerumo, "Conquest and Dispossession," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed . A. Lerumo (London : lnkululeko
Publications, 1971), 10-13.

15

Ibid., 6-8.

16

Ibid., 13-15.

17

Ibid., 17.

6

Kimberley attracted enormous amounts of labour along with British and American
capital investment. Within twenty years of this discovery, roughly three million British
pounds worth of diamonds were exported. Diamond mining comprised approximately
half of all Cape exports. By 1888, the De Beers Company established a monopoly over
diamond mining, which destroyed competition and ensured diamond prices remained
inflated by controlling the stone' s distribution. This centralised power allowed De Beers
to create a racially divided labour force to increase profits through the exploitation of
African worker.:.i. The establishment of a poorly paid labour pool set a precedent for gold
mining and other industries to follow in the subsequent years. In the 1880s, gold was
discovered in Witwatersrand, close to Johannesburg city, in the Transvaal. Gold mining
was dominated by six companies, all of whom possessed the capital required to control
the intensive mining operations. By 1899, Johannesburg employed 100,000 workers and
produced 27 percent of the world's gold. 18 The mining sector consolidated its interests
with the founding of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, which became the greatest
accumulation of capitalist strength in South Africa. 19
Mining interests such as the De Beers Company cooperated with Afrikaner Cape
farmers in the late 1800s to control the supply of African labour. They sought to increase
the availability of cheap African labour through the implementation of new legislation. In
1887 and 1892, legislation was introduced that limited the African franchise in the Cape
by disqualifying land held in common from meeting the property standards needed for
voting. Working and living areas in cities became more racially segregated, while the
18

William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa {New York : Oxford University Press, 2001), 27-28 .

19

A. Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism and the Birth of the Liberation and Labour Movements," in Fifty

Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London: lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 26.

7

aborted Glen Grey Act of 1894 attempted to increase the availability of cheap African
labour and to intensify political segregation. The twentieth century saw the expansion of
segregationist and oppressive legislation in South Africa. 20
With the discovery of the massive gold deposits in Witwatersrand, it became
imperative for the British Empire to assume political and economic control of the
Afrikaner Republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. War between the British
and Boers broke out in October 1899, while hostilities ended when the British emerged
victorious with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on 31 May 1902. The main
diplomats present were Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner for South Africa
and Jan Christiaan Smuts, a Boer general who assaulted the Cape towards the end of the
war. 21 Smuts went on to become heavily involved in South African politics in the
following decades.
Despite the rift that existed between Boers and British during the war, both
groups found ample reasons for cooperation once hostilities ended. The Treaty of
Vereeniging was based on the common understanding of the need to increase the
exploitation of African labour through the elimination of African lands. After the war,
this exploitative system was initially enforced under Milner's military government.
British and Afrikaner interests were further interlinked with the creation of the Union of
South Africa in 1910. The white legislatures of the Transvaal, Cape, Natal and Orange
Free State Colonies voted to unite, while the British agreed to create an "all-white
Parliament for the new self-governing Dominion" of South Africa. Only whites were
permitted to vote in the provinces of this independent Dominion. The only exception was
20

Beinart, Twentieth-Century, 29.

21

Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 26.

8

in the Cape, where a very small portion of coloured and Africans qualified to vote based
on the control of property; however, they could only vote for European representatives.
Due to the economic dominance of the Transvaal, Afrikaner generals Louis Botha and
Jan Christiaan Smuts were elected to lead the first Union government. Together, Botha
and Smuts promoted large mining and farming interests through the increased flow of
African labour paid at the "lowest possible rates ."22
The Union government was favoured by both British and Afrikaners; however,
the advent of \,Vorld War One in 1914 weakened this political unity. Botha and Smuts
brought South Africa into the conflict as a British ally. General J. B. M. Hertzog, the
main proponent of Afrikaner rights, did not favour an alliance with Britain against
Germany. He broke away from the Union government and created the Nationalist Party,
which became a proponent of neutrality and equality of rights between British and Boers.
Botha died during the war, and Smuts thus became Prime Minister. He was defeated in
the 1924 elections by Hertzog and his Nationalist Party, which maintained power for the
next decade. The Great Depression of the 1930s forced Smuts and Hertzog to reconcile
their differences and unite their opposing parties. The year 1934 saw the creation of the
United Party, which maintained power late into the 1940s. The only Boer/Afrikaner
dissent came in the form of D. F. Matan, who feared that Smuts' s pro-British views
would eventually undermine Afrikaner interests. As a result, he formed the Purified
Nationalist Party, which became the opposition to the ruling United Party. 23 During the

22

Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 27-28.

23

Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics in South Africa," The Journal of Politics 22 (Nov., 1960),
www. jsto r. org (accessed 22 January 2014), 683-684.

9

1948 elections, Malan's Purified Nationalist Party defeated the United Party and assumed
control of the government. 24
Modem political and social ideas in the Republic of South Africa evolved in a
setting marred by racial segregation and economic exploitation. The Union government
under Smuts and Botha passed acts and laws to increase the destitution of the black
population. In 1913, the Native Land Act was passed, which reduced the land available
for Africans to less than 13 percent of South Africa's territory. The Act also outlawed
sharecropping, and other forms of tenancy that did not provide labour to white farmers,
thus reducing private African landownership, which meant that successful African
peasants could not become "capitalist farmers." 25 The Act impoverished rural Africans,
much as the mechanization of agriculture had done in the United Kingdom. A poor and
displaced pool of labour was thus created to be exploited by the mining companies and
white owned farms. In the 1920s and '30s, Hertzog' s Nationalist Party introduced what
became known as the Hertzog Bills - legislation to reinforce the political and economic
exploitation of Africans by removing their few remaining voting rights. Segregation was
based on many of the legislative acts introduced by Hertzog. This type of exploitative
legislation was expanded and further entrenched by Malan's Purified Nationalist Party.
After his electoral victory in 1948, Malan implemented apartheid, which was designed to
increase racial separation. Africans were expected to live and develop in their own

24

Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics," 685.

25

Beinart, Twentieth-Century, 56-57.

10

separate racial "Homelands," which amounted to only 13 percent of the land area carved
out in the 1913 Land Act. 26
South Africa experienced great economic changes, and the Europeans working in
South Africa's industrial mining centers found labour conditions even more exploitative
and brutal than those in Europe. Most white workers were Boers who had a history of
discrimination against Africans. As a result, the country' s urban working class was
racially divided, which made it difficult for trade unions and socialists to appeal to both
Europeans and Africans. 27 Nevertheless, socialism took a minor foothold in the country
due to the work of British socialists and labour activists such as David Ivon Jones, Bill
Andrews, and Sidney Bunting. The irony is that most socialists tended to be either
Africans or Eastern Europeans whose ideology did not appeal to the conservative Boer
proletariat, which was represented by the right wing Labour Party.28 These vanguards of
South African socialism helped to create the International Socialist League (ISL) in 1915
by breaking away from the Labour Party - the ISL was the main predecessor of the
CPSA. 29
The year 1921 saw the creation of the CPSA, which was the country' s first
rnmmunist party. It continued to function under this name until Malan ' s Purified
Nationalist Party declared it illegal in 1950. The Communist Party was reconstituted as
an underground organization in 1953, and its name was changed to the South African
26

Thomas K. Ranuga, The New South Africa and the Socialist Vision (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996),

8-9.
27

Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1992), 12.

28

29

Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 42.
Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades, 12.

11

Communist Party (SACP). The CPSA started out as a European socialist organization
(the main leaders were British men such as Jones, Andrews, and Bunting), which sought
the removal of the capitalist system in South Africa. However, by 1928 the CPSA was
transformed from its European roots into a party whose membership was primarily
African. Initially, the Communist Party had trouble reconciling Marxist class struggle
with the existence of African nationalism. 30
The African National Congress (ANC) was originally formed in 1912 in response
to the increasingly segregationist policies of the Union government under Botha and
Smuts. The Native Land Bill passed in 1912 was the first major attack on the remaining
African land rights. An accumulation of oppressive policies highlighted the need for a
national organization to represent all Africans, irrespective of tribal ancestry or
language. 31 State oppression in the twentieth century also led to the creation of the
African Indian Congress (AIC), and the creation of the coloured identity group's African
People's Organization (AP0). 32 The ANC itself was a small organization that drew its
support from traditional chiefs and the African bourgeoisie. Its early goals were to work
within the constitutional system to advance the interests of Africans; however, this
moderate stance changed in the 1940s, during the course of the Second World War.
Under the direction of Dr. A. P. Xuma, and later that of Dr. Albert Luthuli, the ANC was
transformed into a mass national liberation movement. 33

30

Rob Davies, Dan O'Meara, and Sipho Dlamini, The Struggle For South Africa (London: Zed Books Ltd.,

1984), 292.
31

Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 29.

32

Ibid., 31-32.

33

Davies, O'Meara, and Dlamini, The Struggle, 285.

12
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An alliance between the CPSA and the ANC should have been a practical
impossibility. The Communist Party focused on class conflict while the ANC
emphasized the racial problems in South Africa. During the 1930s, the ANC rejected
(

Marxist principles and cut ties with the CPSA. However, in the 1950s the two
organizations merged into a close alliance to achieve African national liberation through
the defeat of the Nationalist government and its apartheid regime. This collaboration
survived the banning of the CPSA in 1950 and that of the ANC in 1960. To date, the
ANC and the Communist Party remain allies in South Africa's political scene.34

Historiography
The historiographical tradition which covers the CPSA is comprised of three
distinct ideologtcal strands: liberal, nationalist, and radical. Each of these schools views
the South African conflict from a different point of view. The liberal historiographical
interpretation is closely related to the British-influenced liberal movement in South
Africa. Liberalism had problems reconciling its defence of white liberty with the political
and social demands of black opposition movements. Liberals did not win a great deal of
support with conservative Afrikaner nationalists or among the more radical black
opposition. 35 Furthermore, they tended to see the Communist Party as a radical political
movement and not necessarily a Soviet puppet.

34

South African History Online, "South African Communist Party (SACP),"
http://www.sahistory.org. za/topic/south -african -communi st-party-sacp (accessed 17 May 2013 ).

35

Benjamin Kline, "The National Union of South African Students: A Case-Study of the Plight of Liberalism,
1924-77," The Journal of Modern African Studies 23 (March, 1985), www. jstor.org (accessed: 22 January,
2014), 139.
'

13

Thomas G. Karis' article "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor,"
explores the perceived communist influence within the ANC from a liberal perspective.
According to Karis, the United States was concerned that the ANC/CPSA alliance would
allow communists loyal to Moscow to captu're the ANC's leadership. Washington feared
that a communist influenced ANC would easily win the vote if the Nationalist
government was defeated. 36 Karis argues that to focus on communist control of the ANC
would not be conducive to a proper understanding of the political scene in South Africa.
The ANC was similar to a national liberation movement as opposed to a full-fledged
political party. Furthermore, the article holds that the CPSA did not control the ANC;
instead, Congress leaders had simply chosen to work with communists because of their
common opposition to the Nationalist Party and its apartheid regime. 37
Tsepo ~echaba and Stephen Ellis' Comrades Against Apartheid offers another
liberal overview of the Communist Party and its interaction with the ANC. The authors
claim that the two organizations were close allies and at times both groups operated as a
single entity. A perfect example of this convergence was the joint creation of MK, the
military branch of the ANC/CPSA alliance. One of the book's arguments is that the
Communist Party used the ANC as a pool from which to recruit highly capable
individuals into its own ranks, which was the primary reason many ANC members were
also communists. 38 Both Sechaba and Ellis saw the Communist Party as a radical
opposition movement. Part of communism's appeal was its portrayal by the media as the

36

Thomas G. Karis, "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," Foreign Affairs 65 (Winter, 1986),
www.jstor.org (accessed: 12 March, 2013), 267.

37

38

Karis, "South African," 267-268.
Ell is and Sechaba, Comrades, 6-7.

14

greatest danger to the Nationalist Party' s survival. However, unlike Karis, the two
authors argue that communists had the ability to dominate the ANC leadership due to
their ability to obtain various high-ranking leadership positions in the organization. 39
'
Raymond Suttner' s The ANC Underground
in South Africa is a liberal

examination of the ANC. However, the book reserves an entire chapter to explore the
Communist Party' s interaction with the ANC. Suttner argues that communists did not
dominate the ANC leadership; instead, the relationship between the two organizations
was multi-dimensional. The CPSA made important contributions to the ANC but this did
not mean that communists were in control of the leadership process. 40 Suttner claims that
the CPSA was a diverse organization with ideological differences based on regional and
provincial affiliations. Communists in Cape Town adhered to a more classic form of
Marxism, while those in the Northern Transvaal tended to mix African spiritual practices
with Marxism. A prime example of this fusion was Flag Boshielo, who was a Central
Committee member of the CPSA while also being a spiritual healer. 41
Nationalist interpretations fall in line with the views of the Purified Nationalist
Party and are ideologically conservative in outlook.42 Nationalist perceptions, such as
Nathaniel Weyl' s Traitor 's End, view the Communist Party as an alarming organization.
Weyl argues that South Africa triumphed and defeated a powerful and dangerous
communist presence within the country, while maintaining a functioning parliament, the
rule of law, and an independent judiciary system. He suggests that during the 1950s and
39

40
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'60s, the Communist Party influenced the activities of the ANC. Communists were given
assistance by the Soviet Union, which placed the South African state in a precarious
· ·
43
pos1t10n.
I

Lloyd Eby's article, "Communism, Totalitarianism, and the African National
Congress," is a scathing indictment of the ANC/CPSA alliance. His views are in line
with Weyl's arguments on the danger of communism in South Africa. Eby claims that the
communist-influenced ANC was a supporter of terrorism and murder. A victorious ANC
would result in the creation of a communist regime under the control of the Soviet Union.
The article argues that the CPSA had a strong influence over Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK),
the military arm of the ANC/CPSA alliance. 44 Eby warns against the danger of achieving
national liberation while overlooking the threat posed by the CPSA. An alliance with
communism w~rnld usher in greater oppression in the form of a Marxist dictatorship of
the proletariat. 45
Like the previous two articles, Morgan Norval's Inside the ANC is another
Nationalist interpretation that portrays the ANC as a dangerous political movement.
Norval argues that peace in South Africa could be achieved if all competing factions
peacefully negotiated and reached a compromise. However, the communist dominated
ANC/CPSA alliance was committing .acts of terrorism and murder to bully its way to a
position of power in any future political negotiations. Norval argues that revolutionary
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change in South African must not be allowed to occur, since the communist-influenced
ANC would use its popularity with the African people to establish a pro-Soviet state.46
Radical interpretations fall in line with the views held by the Multiracial Congress
Alliance. The ANC leads this partnership which also includes the African Indian
Congress (AIC), the African People's Organization (APO), as well as the CPSA. The
predominant ideology is strongly anti-conservative, as illustrated by the ANC ' s
demonstrations against D. F. Malan's Purified Nationalist Party after its 1948 electoral
victory. 47 As a member of the CPSA, Harold Wolpe ' s "Strategic Issues in the Struggle
for National Liberation in South Africa" is a radical perspective on the conflict between
the ANC/CPSA alliance and the Nationalist government. Wolpe argues that to
conceptualise the struggle against apartheid in primarily racial terms fails to properly
examine the problems of class interests, as well as the subsequent alliances made
between various social classes in the black population. With the electoral victory of the
Purified Nationalist Party, South Africa experienced a political shift through the
subordination of the black population to white interests. This shift followed the
implementation of apartheid, a political system in which only whites could participate in
~

"bourgeois democratic form of parliamentary government." The 1950s in South Africa

were marked by the increased coercive power of the state, which forced the ANC and the
CPSA to escalate their resistance through the implementation of political action and mass
mobilization campaigns against the state' s oppressive legislation. 48
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Martin Legassick's article, "South Africa in Crisis: What Route to Democracy?"
examines the country's political and social conflict from a South African communist
perspective. Legassick explains that South Africa's problems are neither racial nor
cultural; instead, they are issues of class conflict between capitalists and workers. 49 At
the heart of the matter is the idea that apartheid is not only a means of racial and cultural
division but also a system designed to maintain the privileged position of the capitalist
class. so Legassick claims that two-thirds of the black population supported the armed
struggle against apartheid undertaken by the ANC/CPSA alliance in the 1960s. Both
organizations would have a difficult time abandoning their military operations for fear of
losing the African people's support. 51 Wolpe and Legassick emphasize the primacy of
class conflict in the struggle against apartheid. Both authors view the escalation of
resistance by t~e ANC and the Communist Party as a necessary response in the face of
increasing government oppression.
In Thomas K. Ranuga's The New South Africa and the Socialist Vision, we have a
radical examination of the history of the ANC/CPSA alliance. Ranuga, unlike Wolpe and
Legassick, focuses on the issue of communist influence in the ANC. One of his main
arguments is that communists never controlled the ANC. The only A C leader closely
associated with Marxism was J. T. Gumede who served as president general of the ANC
from 1927 to 1930. However, the ANC ousted him from power during the 1930s because
of his involvement with the Communist Party. Gumede was replaced by the conservative
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leader Pixley ka Isaka Seme, who ensured that the ANC would not tolerate Marxist
influence. 52 The creation of the Congress Youth League in 1944 also brought about a
more militant form of nationalism in the ANC. The majority of the Youth League ' s
members were strongly anti-communist. They did not trust communist class analysis
since it was seen as a foreign ideology which the CPSA could use to subvert the ANC 's
·
53
mterests.

While various ideological interpretations have already been made regarding the
history of the CPSA and its relations with the ANC, a certain gap remains within the
literature. An analysis of the changes the Communist Party underwent in order to ally
itself with the ANC is still somewhat incomplete. Furthermore, most of these
examinations were written before the publications of Joe Slovo and Nelson Mandela' s
respective auto~iographies. These two primary sources provide a wealth of new
information regarding the ANC and CPSA's interactions. Unlike the liberal and
nationalist historiographical interpretations I previously highlighted, my focus is not on
the degree of communist control in the ANC. Instead, I examine the ideological conflict
the CPSA underwent in order to adapt to the South African setting and how this, in tum,
impacted the power dynamic in the ANC/CPSA alliance. This historical examination is
more closely related to Harold Wolpe.and Martin Legassick's class/race discussion.

The Development of Early CPSA Ideology and the Issue of National Liberation

The success of communism in the Russian Revolution in 1917 ensured that South
African socialists became heavily influenced by Russian communist ideology. After 1917
52
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the International Socialist League began publishing material from the Russian communist
newspaper "Pravda."

54

South Africa's social problems were viewed through a classic

Marxist lens and primary focus was given to the class struggle between workers and
capitalists. 55 The racial oppression of Africa'ns was not emphasised. Subsequently, the
ISL believed it could unite both African and white workers into a single labour
organization to oppose capitalist exploitation. 56 The common argument was that the
racial and economic differences between Africans and whites would not inhibit a union
of the South African proletariat. Socialists claimed they could apply the same
organizational methods used by Russian communists in order to combat Smuts's Union
government.
In 1921 the ISL merged with various socialist organizations to create the
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). Like its socialist predecessor the CPSA once
again invited all workers, irrespective of race, to unite with the World Communist
International. The difference between the Communist Party and the ISL was in the
greater focus the CPSA placed on the recruitment and indoctrination of workers.
Communists accused the Labour Party of being reformist in nature and of catering to the
1vfote middle class while workers' needs were ignored. The CPSA decided that an
aggressive indoctrination campaign aimed at workers was insufficient as a strategy. The
Communist Party concluded it would need the flexibility to use any social umest in the
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country to further the cause of the proletariat. 57 Such discontent soon came in the form of
the 1922 Strike, which was organized by white workers when the Chamber of Mines
diminished their pay. Even though the CPSA had not organized the strike, it nonetheless
offered its support to the striking workers, since the Communist Party saw the strike as a
means to oppose capitalism. The argument was that supporting the white workers would
bring the CPSA closer to defeating the South African state. 58 The 1922 Strike highlighted
the difficulties the CPSA experienced in attempting to create a racially united labour
front. In its support for white labour, the Communist Party failed to include African
workers in the demands for higher pay and skilled employment. The Strike itself was
racially exclusive, since whites refused to include African workers in the labour dispute.
Thus, the CPSA was placed in the difficult position of choosing sides. To make matters
worse, the stri~e was unsuccessful and the majority of white workers abandoned the
Communist Party in favour of the Labour and Nationalist parties. 59
Even as early as 1915, socialists exerted a great deal of effort to include the urban
African workforce in the class struggle. The International Socialist League encouraged
Africans to support white unions in an attempt to create a unified labour front. From its
inception in 1921, the CPSA employed the same policy in the immediate years. 60
However, as early as 1928, communists began to seriously question if a united front

57

Communist Party of South Africa, "Manifesto of the Communist Party of South Africa," in Fifty Fighting

Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London: lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 117-119.
58

Communist Party of South Africa, "The Fight to a Finish," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London :
lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 121.

59

A. Lerumo, "The Turn to the Masses," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London: lnkululeko
Publications, 1971), 51-52.

60

S.P. Bunting, "Ten Crowded Years of Glorious Life," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London:
lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 123.
'

21

between African and white workers remained a possibility to be pursued. In 1928, the
Communist International ' s Executive Committee argued that South Africa' s inherent
social, economic, and political problems made it practically impossible for communists
to appeal to both African and white workers. The Executive Committee made certain key
observations, such as the fact that the overall African population at the time had
increased to roughly 5,500,000, while whites numbered 1,500,000. Despite the fact that
Africans were the overwhelming demographic majority, they were only legally entitled
to 13 percent of the country' s territory, while whites claimed the rest. Furthermore, there
was no African bourgeoisie to speak of, while the vast majority of the country ' s working
class was African. In the industrial and transportation sectors, Africans numbered
420,000, while whites only comprised a tally of 145,000. In the agricultural sector, there
were 435,000 ~frican labourers as opposed to only 50,000 whites . The Executive
Committee understood that the proportion of African workers within the country grew
faster than that of whites. Furthermore, African employees earned much less than their
white counterparts due to racially discriminatory labour practices. 61
The Communist International's Executive Committee realized it was imperative
to accelerate the recruitment of Africans into the CPSA. Even as early as the mid- l 920s,
communists were active in the Industrial and Commercial Workers ' Union of South
Africa (I CU). The ICU was created in 1919 and operated as a general union for African
workers and peasants. By the late 1920s the ICU had 100,000 members and was deeply
involved in trade unionism and matters of African nationalism.
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comprised the overwhelming majority of the country' s labour force, they faced serious
discrimination in the workplace. Communists were well aware of these issues and sought
to use them to further the goals of the CPSA. In tum, this action brought the Communist
I

Party closer to acknowledging South Africa's racial problems.
The widening split between white and African workers was further increased by
the policies of the Labour Party of South Africa. In 1915 this organization split away
from the International Socialist League and began to favour racial policies that benefitted
white labour at the expense of African workers. By 1922 the majority of miners working
in the Transvaal were poor Afrikaners displaced from their farms due to an economic
depression in the 1920s. The Labour Party and Hertzog's Nationalist Party both drew
their support from this impoverished demographic. In 1923, both political parties entered
into a close alliance which formed the main opposition to Smuts' s Union government. 63
The Communist Intemational's Executive Committee understood that this alliance sought
to benefit white labour at the expense of African workers. The CPSA accused the Labour
Party of indoctrinating white workers with a racist ideology.64
In 1926 communists were expelled from the fast-growing Industrial and
Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa (ICU). Its leadership was at odds with
communist ideology and feared that the CPSA would attempt to gain control of the
ICU. 65 The Executive Committee interpreted this expulsion as the work of black
reformist leaders corrupted by the Labour and Nationalist parties. Communists feared
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their fallout with the ICU could lead to the political marginalization of the CPSA. 66 The
interests of white and African workers were in discord due to legislation introduced by
the state to control African unions. The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act did not legally
recognize unions that included Africans in their membership, and racially inclusive
labour unions were not allowed to operate in the work place. 67 However, Africans still
had the right to strike to address political grievances due to a loophole in the legal
system. Agreements between trade unions and employers that took Africans into
consideration were not legally enforceable in the country. The Executive Committee
highlighted the difficulties this created in maintaining a united labour front. White
workers chose to side with the state to maintain their privileged position to the detriment
of African workers. 68 The Afrikaner Broederbond, created in 1919, was a secret
organization th!:lt chan1pioned Boer interests. One of its main objectives was to make sure
Afrikaner trade unions were not influenced by outside sources such as communism.
During the 1930s and ' 40s, the Broederbond became a major supporter of Malan ' s
Purified Nationalist Party, which helped to diminish the Communist Party' s appeal
among the white labour movement. 69
The Communist International's Executive Committee initially examined the
South African problem through Marxist principles of class conflict and capitalist
exploitation. It saw Smuts's Union government and Hertzog' s Nationalist Party as an
alliance between British capitalism and Boer bourgeoisie, which increased the black
66
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population' s economic exploitation. 70 However, Marxist interpretations had to eventually
consider the South African context. By 1928, the Communist Party of South Africa had
grown in size, numbering 1,750 members, of which 1,600 were coloured or African.
Communists were thus compelled to consider the racial problems faced by African
workers, who were hit especially hard by Hertzog's Nationalist Party during the 1920s.71
The Creswell Wage Act of 1925 and the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926
caused thousands of Africans to lose their jobs in skilled positions as they were replaced
by white workers who received higher rates of pay. 72 The state successfully courted
white workers by placing their interests at odds with those of African workers, which
forced the Communist International ' s Executive Committee to acknowledge that class
analysis was insufficient when tackling South Africa' s problems. The racial factor that
drove the Unioi;i government and the Nationalist Party to enact their segregationist
policies had to be taken into account. Furthermore, an organization comprised of 1,750
supporters was by no means a mass movement, thus some communists claimed that a
change of strategy was needed to increase the CPSA' s appeal in South Africa.
By 1928 the Communist International' s Executive Committee regarded the
CPSA's decision to create a united labour front between Africans and whites as a failed
strategy. The CPSA had not placed sufficient attention on the issue of African national
liberation, thus the Communist Party was urged to change its strategy away from class
struggle and focus on national liberation. South Africa would become an independent
republic free of white minority rule, thus the Communist Party was expected to place its
70
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ideology of class struggle on hold. The CPSA was to give primacy to racial issues such
as segregation and African liberation. 73 Initially the CPSA resisted the Executive
Committee's new strategy. A delegation led by S. P. Bunting argued that the Executive
Committee had incorrectly assumed that issues of national liberation took precedence
over the class struggle. However, due to the CPSA's loyalty to the Communist
International, the new strategy was adopted in 1929, although not without a great deal of
internal opposition. 74 Recalling the CPSA's change of strategy, Joe Slovo remarked that
" ... in contrast to the position in 1922, the Party's membership was overwhelmingly
black and its ideology had moved a long way towards an understanding that the main
immediate content of the South African revolutionary endeavor is the national liberation
of the African people." 75
The new focus on race and national liberation meant the CPSA would have to
cooperate with the ANC - the most significant African organization in the country. The
goal was to transform the ANC from a moderate liberal organization into a revolutionary
force capable of challenging the South African government for control of the country.
Communists planned to weaken the influence traditional chiefs had within the ANC. The
CPSA believed the chiefs were collaborating with Hertzog's Nationalist Party. Some
within the CPSA argued that the radicalization of the ANC should be the Communist
Party's primary mission in order to achieve the Communist International's goal of
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creating an independent republic. 76 The CPSA's internal ideological debate between
race-related issues such as African liberation versus the proletariat's class struggle
against capitalism, ultimately served to create serious problems for the Communist Party
in the following years.

Communist Infighting and the Rise of the AN C's Youth League

As a member of the CPSA and a Communist International representative, D. G.
Wolton was convinced the CPSA was on the wrong path. He accused S. P. Bunting, the
general secretary of the Communist Party, of leading a right wing movement within the
organization. Wolton and Lazar Bach, a young communist of Latvian descent, instigated
a leftist purge within the Communist Party, thus beginning a deep sectarianism, which
led to the eventual removal of Bunting and important trade union leaders. With Bunting
gone, Wolton became the new general secretary, a role Bach would later inherit.
Together, Wolton and Bach claimed the Executive Committee's proposal for the CPSA
to focus on race problems, such as African national liberation, meant for the Communist
Party to organize a socialist revolution in South Africa. Their opponents, led by Moses
Kotane who later became general secretary, countered that the Executive Committee had
intended for the CPSA to organize a national democratic revolution and not a socialist
one. Kotane's faction challenged Wolton and Bach's leadership, claiming the CPSA
should work to understand and cater to the "masses" and their demands.
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Wolton and

Bach were accused of focusing on pointless doctrinal factors, such as the dispute between
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Stalin and Trotsky, while ignoring the fact they lived in a country whose population had
never experienced the history of labour mobilisation seen by Europe. 78 The CPSA lost a
great deal of its membership during the 1930s, with communists who favoured
democratic revolution over the more traditional focus on socialist revolt being expelled
from its ranks. 79
The Communist Party's infighting is significant because it anticipated the
eventual alliance between the ANC and the CPSA in two significant ways. Membership
attrition weakened the CPSA, which meant it was in no position to significantly influence
the ANC by the time the two organizations began working together in the 1940s. By the
time of its banning in 1950, the Communist Party was small and needed to work through
other political movements to remain relevant in the country's political scene. Slovo
admitted that much: "It was becoming clearer than ever that the catalyst for real change
in South Africa could only come from a challenge by the racially dominated. And this
challenge was growing, more especially from the black workers." 80 By 1935 the majority
of the CPSA supported Kotane's focus on democratic revolution and Bach was
expelled. 81 The CPSA became involved in race issues that affected the black population,
s•1ch as segregation and racism. The Communist Party understood that the apartheid
regime had to be removed before it could implement its doctrine of class conflict in order
to create a dictatorship of the proletariat. The CPSA realized that its goal of creating an
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independent republic could only be achieved through cooperation with a mass national
liberation movement such as the ANC.
While the CPSA recovered from its years of infighting, developments within the
ANC further weakened the communist position in the eventual alliance. The ANC ' s
Youth League (YL) was created in 1944 at the Bantu Men' s Social Center. The meeting
was comprised of an elite group of young Africans, such as Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu,
and Nelson Mandela, who were all educated at Fort Hare University. They were
convinced that only African nationalism could solve racial oppression in South Africa. 82
As Chief Albert Luthuli recalled: "The founding of the Congress Youth League had met
a long-standing need, giving to young men a sphere of action, and assurance that the days
of polite, unheeded complaint were over." 83 The shared feeling was that the AN C' s
leadership was too focused on protecting the rights of the African elite and as such was
not concerned with the common African. Dr. A. P. Xuma was voted out of the AN C' s
presidency, while the YL began preparations for a Program of Action designed to tum
the ANC into a mass movement through the implementation of "confrontational protests,
boycotts, and passive resistance." 84 The YL represented a more radical movement in the
ANC, calling for the creation of a new South Africa based on racial equality. The country
would become a democratic society in which all adult individuals could vote.
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Furthermore, the YL vehemently rejected the notion that British and Afrikaner political
parties cared for the well-being of the African people. 85
While the YL sought to fuel African Nationalism and thus turn the ANC into a
more radical organization that could actively fight for the rights of Africans, it was also
deeply mistrustful of communist ideology. YL members saw Marxist principles as
concepts that were foreign to South Africa and therefore could not be used to solve the
country's troubled situation. Mandela expressed this sentiment, "We were," he noted,
"extremely wary of communism ... Lembede felt that the Communist Party was
dominated by whites, which undermined African self-confidence and initiative." Most
within the YL argued that accepting communist help would lead to the weakening of
African nationalism. The YL opposed the inclusion of whites into the AN C's nationalist
movement on the grounds that Africans needed to stop being "enamored of white
culture." 86
Some within the Youth League, including Mandela himself, became friends with
communist activists; however, the YL still harboured a deep mistrust of communism.
Mandela explains that he was opposed to the ANC working with communists because he
frared the CPSA would dominate the ANC's leadership due to the Communist Party's
experience and training. Mandela "believed that it was an undiluted African nationalism,
not Marxism or multiculturalism, that would liberate us ... I even went so far as breaking
up CP meetings by storming the stage ... " 87 The YL sought to build a powerful African
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national movement to overthrow the Nationalist Party' s apartheid regime which
oppressed the black population through the implementation of racist legislation. The
strategy was opposed to the CPSA' s view that Africans were discriminated against as an
economic class; instead, the YL argued that Africans were facing persecution primarily
because of their race. 88
While the ANC continued to allow communists to work within its ranks, it is
apparent that the younger leadership, represented by Mandela and the Youth League
(YL), was quite suspicious and antagonistic towards the CPSA. This atmosphere of
mistrust and doubt made the new generation of ANC leaders wary of communist
influences. Thus, if the CPSA wished to work with the ANC, it could not afford to
engage in attempts to gain control of an already deeply suspicious ANC leadership. The
CPSA' s acceptance of the independent republic strategy served to placate the ANC, since
it signified that the Communist Party accepted the need to focus on racial issues, such as
African national liberation, before considering the class struggle. The fact that the YL
had radicalized the ANC meant that the Communist Party no longer needed to weaken
the authority of traditional chiefs in the ANC. Furthermore, the CPSA' s infighting during
tl.e 1930s had weakened the party by diminishing its membership. As such, if
communists wanted to work with the ANC, they would have to abide by its rules .

The CPSA and the ANC Forge Closer Ties
Closer ties between the Communist Party and the ANC only really developed
from the mid- l 940s onwards. The common challenges faced by both organizations
forced their members to cooperate, thus increasing their interaction and familiarity with
88
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one another. In 1946, after the end of the Second World War, a major event occurred in
the Witwatersrand mining complex that changed the political setting in South Africa. The
African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU), led by the CPSA's J.B. Marks, organized a
strike against the Chamber of Mines. The AMWU demanded better living conditions and
higher pay, as well as the removal of War Measure 1425, which banned union meetings
in the mining complex. The Chamber of Mines refused to negotiate with the AMWU.
Therefore, from August 12-19, the AMWU launched a massive strike in which 100,000
African workers participated, thus bringing a significant portion of the mining industry to
a halt. Smuts's United Party crushed the strike through violence and repression.
AMWU's leaders, as well as the CPSA's general secretary, Moses Kotane, were accused
of conspiracy to initiate the labour dispute. 89 The Communist Party's entire Johannesburg
wing supported the AMWU's mass strike. Slovo recalled that:" ... at night we
maneuvered our way in a borrowed car around the mining areas between Springs and
Braamfontein, looking for opportunities to put up posters and throw leaflets over the
guarded work-prisons of the black miners." 90
The African Mine Workers' Union itself had been created jointly by members
from both the ANC and the CPSA. Some of these activists, including J.B. Marks,
belonged to both organizations. Like the Communist Party, the ANC dedicated
considerable resources towards helping the AMWU. During the strike, Mandela worked
in close cooperation with Marks in the mining complex to formulate the AMWU's
strategy. When recalling these events, Mandela noted that: "The strike was the beginning
of my close relationship with Marks ... we discussed my opposition to communism at
89
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great length ... I had these same discussions with Moses Kotane and Yusuf Dadoo, both
of whom believed, like Marks, that communism had to be adapted to the African
situation.',91 During the weeklong strike, many ANC and CPSA activists forged closer
ties, which were made possible by the CPSA's acceptance of the independent republic
strategy, which championed racial issues over those of class. 92 The Communist Party's
involvement on the side of African workers was a perfect example of the CPSA dealing
with racial issues, such as workplace discrimination. The strike helped the CPSA reach a
common understanding with the ANC on the urgent need to end the apartheid regime.
Furthermore, by 1946 the majority of the Communist Party's membership was African,
which must have helped convince the Youth League to soften its anti-communist
stance. 93 The AMWU's strike was the first serious campaign to bring ANC and CPSA
activists together against a common enemy represented by Smuts's United Party.
The 1946 strike brought to the fore the power that African workers could wield
against the state due to their ability for mass mobilisation. The white population was
likely scared into voting more extreme elements into power during the 1948 elections. It
was during this year that Malan's Purified Nationalist Party ran on its racist apartheid
election platform and ultimately defeated Smuts's United Party. After their victory, the
Nationalists moved to consolidate their power by terminating the right to vote still
available to a minority of coloured people. White political representatives who spoke for
Africans were also removed from the political system. In 1950, the Purified Nationalist
Party banned the CPSA under the Suppression of Communism Act. Ten years later, the
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ANC was also declared an illegal organization. Furthermore, the Nationalist government
gave itself the legislative power to declare any organization illegal. The state also
assumed the power to censor individuals and to confine them to house arrest without trial
in the judicial system. 94
Malan's Nationalist government was quick to implement its apartheid system,
which was modelled on the segregationist policies present in South Africa prior to the
1948 elections. Apartheid's core concepts were based on racial separation, preservation
of political institutions for whites only, segregation of urban and rural areas, control of
African movement to cities, greater racial separation of the labour market, and
segregation of public facilities. The Nationalists "Afrikanerized" the state apparatus to
ensure they maintained power. Thus, Afrikaners were placed in key areas in the state,
such as the army and the intelligence departments. The new Nationalist regime under
Malan quickly created new legislation to reflect its apartheid ideology. The year 1950
saw the creation of the Immorality Act, which banned marriage and sexual relations
"across racial boundaries."95 The Group Areas Act in 1950 and the Prevention of Illegal
Squatting Act in 1951, allowed the Nationalist government to racially divide urban land
and move people across the new racial boundaries. During 1953, the Reservation of
Separate Amenities Act was passed, which allowed the government to create racially
divided and unequal public facilities. 96

94

Neville Curtis, "South Africa: The Politics of Fragmentation," Foreign Affairs 50 (Jan., 1972),
www.jstor.org (accessed: 22 January, 2014), 283-284.

95

96

Beinart, Twentieth-Century, 147-148.
Ibid ., 152-153.

34

- - . , , ,. . , . ~ - . . . _ . _ , . _

•

.,.,-..

_

.,.

•••-•..-.,,.,

...

1• ..

,.,.,.,r.,. .,. . .,.,..,...,..-...,. ___ ,___

,,_,

·-··-••• ~- ••••• •~ • • ••••,•;•••;•••

As a direct response to these racist policies passed against the black population,
the ANC implemented the Youth League's Program of Action in order to transform the
ANC into a national mass movement. Reqilling the implementation of the AN C's new
strategy, Mandela wrote that: "the Youth League had seen the failure oflegal and
constitutional means to strike at racial oppression; now the entire organization was set to
enter a more activist stage." The ANC was to use new strategies, such as strikes,
boycotts, passive resistance, and stay-at-homes, to defy the Nationalists and their
apartheid regime. 97
The CPSA itself was unprepared for its ban under the Nationalist Suppression of
Communism Act in 1950. Its Central Committee, headed by Moses Kotane, announced
that the Communist Party would be disbanded. Slovo recalled, "most of us were stunned
by the Central Committee announcement that in the face of the ban the Party had no
option but to dissolve itself." 98 After the initial shock wore off, ex-party members such as
Slovo, convened and indicated their desire to reconstitute the CPSA as an underground
organization. The old Central Committee was informed that unless it took steps to
reconstitute the Communist Party, veteran members would move to create a separate
organization. However, many comm~ists were not prepared to re-join the CPSA in an
illegal manner, and membership suffered. To show the organization's new status as an
underground movement, its name was changed from the CPSA to that of the SACP. 99
Due to the Communist Party' s illegality, communists who sought to (officially) continue
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their political activism in the country had to operate through other legal organizations.
Thus they became more involved with the ANC, which was the largest African-based
organization in the country. From 1950 to 1960, SACP members devoted considerable
effort and time to the AN C's goal of overthrowing the Nationalist Party and its apartheid
regime. It was during the 1950s that the ANC/SACP alliance was finalized, prompting
one of the AN C's main leaders, Oliver Tambo, to claim that the SACP and ANC were
the "two pillars" of the "liberation movement". 100 Simply put, communists who wanted
to remain relevant as political activists had no other choice but to operate through legal
organizations such as the ANC. It was not only the safest alternative available, but it also
went hand in hand with the principles of the independent republic strategy, where issues
of race such as African liberation and the destruction of apartheid, were given primacy
over class ideology. Furthermore, the newly reformed and renamed SACP had been
weakened from the party's infighting during the 1930s. Its membership was small, and it
had lost even more influence in the country due to its banning. Working with the ANC
became the only real viable alternative in order to remain relevant in South Africa.
During a meeting of the ANC and African Indian Congress (AIC) it was proposed
that the various South African liberation movements could no longer afford to remain
divided. The Communist Party's ban in 1950 and apartheid's oppressive policies
constituted a danger which could not be ignored. Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, a prominent member
of the AIC and the SACP, agreed with Nelson Mandela, who represented the AN C's
Youth League, that the Communist Party's ban constituted a serious danger to all other
liberation movements. South African activists would have to create a united front in
order to oppose the Nationalist government. It was at this meeting that Oliver Tambo
100

Slovo, 5/ovo, 103-104.

36

stated that: "Today it is the Communist Party. Tomorrow it will be our trade unions, our
Indian Congress, our APO, our African National Congress." In response to the
Suppression of Communism Act, as well as the murder of eighteen Africans by the police
on May 1, the ANC, the AIC, the APO, and the SACP united to stage a National Day of
Protest on June 26, 1950.
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The SACP's hopes of creating an alliance with the ANC

were finally realized once the Nationalists began to threaten all liberation movements
with the possibility of illegality. The Communist Party's banning influenced the ANC
into joining ranks with the SACP, a goal many communists harbored since 1928, when
the independent republic strategy had been introduced by the Communist International's
Executive Committee. The creation of the ANC/SACP alliance had nothing to do with
communist persuasion; instead, the Nationalist government had become far too great a
threat for the ANC to be able to afford the luxury of operating without allies.
The 1950s saw numerous campaigns launched by the ANC and its communist
allies against the apartheid regime. The campaigns included the 1950 Defend Free
Speech Convention, which had made May 1st a "People's Holiday," all the way to the
massive 1952 Defiance Campaign where a total of 8000 individuals voluntarily chose to
be arrested for their opposition to the Nationalist government's racist legislation.
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Over

the course of its five-month duration, the Defiance Campaign received a great deal of
support and publicity, which ultimately resulted in the registered membership of the
ANC rising from 20,000 to 100,000 members. In response, the Nationalist regime felt
threatened by the campaign's racial unity, which was a direct challenge to its policy of
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racial separation. The Nationalists claimed that the protests were led by communist
agitators, and passed new legislation in 1953 that successfully stopped the Defiance
Campaign. The subsequent passing of the Public Safety Act allowed the government to
arrest people and incarcerate them without trial while also declaring martial law. The
Laws Amendment Act was later introduced to allow the Nationalist regime to use
"corporal punishment" against protesters. 103
Due to cooperation between SACP and ANC members in the various national
liberation campaigns of the 1950s, some of the ANC's apprehension regarding
communism began to break down. Fellow activists from both organizations started to see
each other as comrades in arms against a common enemy. Mandela wrote that: "Because
of my friendship with Kotane," among others, "and my observation of their own
sacrifices, I was finding it more and more difficult to justify my prejudice against the
party." 104 Mandela saw these SACP members primarily as activists who had made
serious sacrifices and risked being persecuted by the Nationalist government in order to
contribute to the cause of African national liberation. Communists started to be judged
based on their contributions towards the ANC's goals and not on their ideology.
Mandela immersed himself in Marxist philosophy to gain more insight regarding
his communist allies. To his surprise, he was able to relate his experiences as a freedom
fighter to Marxist calls for revolution against the status quo . The fact that communists,
and in particular, the Soviet Union, were willing to support national liberation
movements in third-world countries softened Mandela's views regarding the inclusion of
communists in the ANC's ranks. Mandela claimed he saw no contradiction between the
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ideology of "African nationalism" and communism. He was primarily an "African
nationalist" engaged in the liberation of South Africa from the rule of a white elite
representing a minority of the population. Mandela wrote that as a freedom fighter, he
was prepared to use any ideology and any means necessary to defeat apartheid and to
remove "human prejudice" from South Africa. He explained that as revolutionaries,
communists and African nationalists had much more in common as opposed to what
divided them. Mandela concluded that he did not need to become a Marxist in order to
cooperate with communists against the apartheid regime. While some have questioned
the degree of communist control over the ANC, Mandela cautioned that the ANC itself
may very well have been the one who used the SACP to accomplish its own goals of
national liberation. 105
From Mandela's recounting of his dealings with the SACP while engaged in the
liberation of the country, it is apparent that he started to tolerate communism. He saw that
prominent SACP members such as Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, and Joe Slovo were all
extremely committed to the AN C's cause of national liberation. They were devoted
liberation fighters and Mandela chose to overlook their Marxist ideology and instead
focus on their contributions to African national liberation.
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The A C's president, Chief

Albert Luthuli, made the following remark regarding communist involvement in the
ANC:
There are Communists in the South African resistance, and .. . our primary
concern is liberation, and we are not going to be sidetracked by ideological
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clashes and witch hunts. Nobody in Congress may use the organisation to further
any aims but those of Congress.
Luthuli further clarified why the SACP was allowed to work with the ANC: "When I col

operate with Communists in Congress affairs I am not co-operating with Communism.
We leave our differing political theories on one side until the day of liberation, and in the
meantime we are co-operating in a defined area, in the cause of liberation."
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The ANC

leadership was not interested in Marxist ideology; however, it was also not prepared to
refuse a useful ally such as the CPSA.
As I stated previously, the SACP never achieved a mass following. In fact, its
membership had decreased during the infighting of the 1930s; with the banning of the
CPSA numerous communists declined to join the SACP as underground activists. The
banning of the Communist Party also meant that its members were only able to work
effectively within the ANC' s ranks. Therefore, the SACP operated from a position of
weakness in its dealings with the ANC, which was a mass movement that still enjoyed
legal recognition until 1960. As such, communists could not afford to risk losing their
only avenue to political relevancy in South Africa through an attempt at converting the
A C into a communist puppet. There was no need for the SACP to take such a course of
action. Marxists had already adopted the independent republic strategy, which called for
the SACP to aid the ANC in achieving national liberation of outh Africa. As such, the
immediate and practical goals for the two organizations were the same and they both
regarded the urban African workforce as their main support base. Thus, the A C and the
SACP had to deal with a common set of demands from their constituents, such as
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responding to the deterioration of African social and economic standards due to the
implementation of the Purified Nationalist Party' s apartheid regime.
Communists saw themselves as the guardians of the liberation struggle, and it was
during the mass movements of the 1950s that the SACP was put to the test. The
Communist Party's Central Committee operated on an almost constant basis in order to
examine all the major issues facing the ANC/SACP alliance in its numerous campaigns
against the apartheid regime. Joe Slovo remarked that the SACP had achieved its
respected position in the ANC's ranks through the means of "persuasion and example"
and not with "caucus and manipulation." As Slovo himself acknowledged, due to the
SACP's tight knit and structured nature, it had a "powerful organizational position";
however, the SACP's leader, Moses Kotane, discouraged the Communist Party from
attempting to dominate the ANC's decision making process, fearing this would lead to
sectarianism. Slovo recognized that Kotane's manner of dealing with the A C was the
main contributing factor which influenced the ANC to accept an alliance with the ACP.
He was well respected by all liberation fighters, and the ANC's leader, Chief Albert
Luthuli, considered Kotane to be one of his closest advisors.
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Kotane's strong and

ggressive leadership style helped significantly with the A C's acceptance of the ACP.
Kotane's abrasive leadership style conv.inced the A C that he was not a weak leader
influenced by white communists. Slovo recalled that Kotane had no problem exercising
his authority over white Marxists whom he perceived to challenge him. "Kotane·s
confidence in himself and his assertive, often bullying style (which knew no color bar)
made an enormous contribution to the acceptance of the Party as a truly indigenous
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In 1959 the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) split from the ANC in protest against
the inclusion of "non-Africans," which was similar to the race-class wrangling that the
Communist Party had to contend with. However, unlike the ANC, the PAC did not
believe in multiracialism; it denounced the ANC for being under the control of whites,
for not being radical enough, and for being dominated by communists. 111 On March 21 ,
1959, the PAC held a demonstration in the Sharpeville township; police fired upon the
unarmed demonstrators, killing 69 people that day. 112 Many of those who died were
women and childrvn shot from behind while attempting to flee. South Africa came under
heavy criticism from the international community, including the United Nations Security
Council. The Nationalist government insisted that the violence at Sharpeville was a
scheme designed by communists seeking to destabilize the country.
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The ANC and its

communist allies decided that a strike had to be organized to protest the killings, while
sympathy generated by the brutal attack would also be used to launch a campaign against
South Africa's despised pass laws. To organise the upcoming campaigns, a decision
making group was created, which included Mandela and Slovo, among others.
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On

March 28, hundreds of thousands of Africans responded to the AN C's call and remained
in their homes, while fifty thousand people protested the shootings in the township of
Langa. In response, the state declared martial law and cancelled the right to habeas
corpus.
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As a result of the mass protests, the Nationalist government banned the ANC in
1960. It was during the era of 1960 to 1963 that the SACP made its greatest contribution
to the ANC and its cause of national liberation. Once the ANC had become an illegal
entity, it faced a whole other set of problems for which it was not initially prepared. The
ANC, unlike the Communist Party, was a mass movement, which made it much harder
for it to operate in a clandestine and illegal manner. Like the Communist Party, the ANC
contained leadership elements that were unprepared for operating in an underground
·
•
116
orgamzat10n.

By the beginning of the 1960s, the ANC's campaigns were losing support from
the people. The latest stay-at-home drive was a failure due to lack of participation.
Mandela had become disillusioned with the ANC's strategy, claiming that because the
Nationalist Party was destroying nonviolent protests through the use of its armed forces,
the ANC needed to respond by changing its tactics. The SACP had just formally
announced its reconstitution and was planning to create its own military branch. Mandela
believed the time had come for the ANC to turn to armed struggle, and he proposed this
idea to the ANC's Working Committee. Mandela's proposal was defeated by the SACP's
General Secretary, Moses Kotane, who was also one of the more powerful members of
the AN C's Executive Committee. Kotane countered that the old ways of nonviolent
protest were still viable; if the ANC turned to armed struggle then a great deal of
individuals could be hurt. 117 At a separate meeting, Mandela explained that the ANC
could no longer continue to operate by the standards of nonviolence when the state used
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'
armed oppression against Africans. He argued that Kotane still saw the ANC as a legal
organization even though it had been banned by the state. If the ANC did not act, it
risked losing its hold on the populace, which had begun resorting to instances of armed
struggle against the Nationalist government. Upon hearing these arguments, Kotane
relented in his opposition, and Mandela was able to get the next Working Committee to
accept the armed struggle proposal. 118
Kotane was obviously well respected throughout the ANC to successfully oppose
Mandela's proposal. However, as a communist within the ANC, Kotane worked from a
position of weakness. The SACP had to constantly operate within the parameters of
national liberation so as not to estrange the ANC. While Kotane might have been
persuaded by Mandela's arguments, it is also likely he did not wish to create divisions
between the SA~P and ANC. Mandela was a member of the Youth League who had
originally opposed the inclusion of communists in the ANC. Even though he eventually
accepted the SACP as a valuable ally despite the organization's Marxist ideology, Kotane
was fully aware of Mandela's past opposition. Communists were accepted in the ANC
because they were hard-working liberation fighters who muted their communist ideology
in favour of supporting African national liberation. It is highly likely that Kotane
discontinued his opposition to Mandela;s proposal so as not to gain an enemy who could
create a rift between the ANC and SACP. This would indicate that the Communist Party
had to be careful not to step out of line within the ANC.
In 1961 the A C's National Executive accepted the Working Committee's
decision to commence the armed struggle. Chief Luthuli advised the rest of the A C
leadership to keep this decision a secret in order to protect the organization's allies, such
118
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as the African Indian Congress and the African People's Organization. The Nationalist
government had not yet banned these liberation movements. The ANC and SACP ' s plan
was to keep this military organization subordinate to their orders, while it would give the
appearance of operating as a separate entity with no affiliation to the ANC/SACP
alliance. Mandela was authorized to oversee the ANC's military wing while working
with whomever he deemed fit in order to lead the armed struggle.

11 9

The new military

institution, named Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), publicly presented itself as a distinct
entity seeking to support the national liberation movement.

120

Mk was run in an

egalitarian manner by the ANC and SACP, while its High Command was comprised of
Mandela and Slovo who represented their respective organizations. Together, the two
revolutionaries decided on which individuals would complete MK's High Command
structure. However, Mandela and Slovo's decisions had to be approved by the
ANC/SACP alliance.
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Even though communists played an important role in the creation of MK, they
were unable to gain an advantage in its leadership. The close working association
between the ANC and the SACP meant that MK was run in a fair and friendly manner
between communists and non-communists alike. After the leaderships of both the ANC
and the SACP had been neutralized in South Africa by the Nationalist government, MK
fell primarily under the influence and control of the AN C's foreign operation in
Tanzania. After 1963, it took time for the SACP to rebuild an effective and centralized
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leadership outside South Africa. The ANC was operating primarily out of Tanzania,
whose government favoured the PAC over the ANC. It perceived the PAC as being more
militant and more revolutionary because it did not have white communists in its ranks.
Therefore, the ANC's alliance with the Communist Party became somewhat problematic,
and the SACP had to tread very lightly so as not to create suspicion among the Tanzanian
government. 122
By the time that the armed struggle had begun, the SACP was distributing
propaganda material after its reconstitution in 1960. In the 1962 document, "The Road to
South African Freedom," the SACP issued an appeal for the righteousness of its cause as
a part of the national liberation movement. The Communist Party sought to reach
Africans by writing of the injustice of the political and social situation in South Africa,
where three million whites held political and economic privilege over the majority of the
African population, which numbered eleven million.
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The document used Marxist

philosophy to explain that the racial oppression within the country existed because of the
exploitative nature of capitalism. However, communists made sure to state that the
SACP's most urgent and immediate goal was that of African national liberation. The
Communist Party's main objective was to unite all classes of the racially abused majority
with the aims of creating a "national democratic revolution" to bring down the
Nationalist government and its apartheid regime. Emphasis was placed on the fact that
the national revolution would create African liberation and stop racial oppression.
Furthermore, the Communist Party explained that the interests of the working class were
122

Slovo, 5/ovo, 177-178.

123

South African communist Party, "The Road to South African Freedom," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A.

Lerumo (London: lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 157.

47

•.;;_,..'

~,

~

.,._ ....... ~.

--- - -

---

-

--

..,_

. -

the same as those of the SACP itself, and with the overthrow of apartheid, the SACP
would seek to create a democratic government that would guarantee "freedom and
equality of rights." 124 Throughout this document, it is apparent that the SACP chose to
largely ignore communist ideology in favour of supporting the ANC's goal of achieving
national liberation. In many ways, the SACP was acting as a surrogate that supported the
goals of the national liberation movement at the expense of its own Marxist ideology,
which would normally call for a class war against the capitalist class.
In 1963, the SACP's Central Committee released a document titled "The
Revolutionary Way Out," which was written to win support for the ANC, SACP, and
MK. In this document, the Communist Party explained that the Nationalist government
had gone too far with its oppressive policies. Africans were ready to support banned
organizations such as the ANC and the SACP, as well as an armed struggle against the
Nationalist state. 125 The Communist Party declared the ANC to be the ideal African
national liberation movement, while its struggle to overthrow apartheid could always
depend on the full support of the SACP.
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The document argues that SACP and ANC

leaders should listen to the general populace's calls for a more forceful resistance against
Nationalist oppression. Any action undertaken by the oppressed should be "principled"
and represent the goals and tactics of the :'national leadership," or risk descending into
127

"adventurism" and mere revenge without a carefully planned course of action.
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defence of the ANC and the SACP alike, the document states that the Nationalist
government was misinformed in its claim that the ANC had been overrun by
communists. The ANC would never allow an outside force to control its leadership after
having fought for so long to maintain its existence against the attacks of the Nationalist
government. The document argues that the reason why the ANC and the SACP were able
to work together was that both organizations shared the same goal of African national
liberation. 128
Throughout this document, we see that the SACP was once again attempting to
promote the goals of the ANC/SACP alliance. It is evident that the Communist Party
sought to defend MK and the turn to violence by justifying the need for an armed
struggle against the Nationalist government, while also explaining that the ANC had not
been taken over by communists. A great deal of concern was placed on the issue of
African national liberation and supporting the ANC's goals. The communist ideology of
class struggle was almost entirely absent. It is evident that the SACP muted its own
ideological beliefs in order to work within the ANC's ranks. As such, the Communist
Party reinforced the ANC's race-centred national liberation approach, while its own
ideology of class struggle remained muted.

Conclusion
The ANC/SACP alliance was built out of the necessity to work together against a
common enemy. The rise of Malan's Purified Nationalist Party during the 1948 elections
instituted a much harsher form of segregation in the form of apartheid. Racist legislation
made life increasingly more difficult for South Africa's black population. The Nationalist
128
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government was also prepared to ban any organization it saw as a threat to its rule . The
banning of the Communist Party in 1950 warned the ANC that the Nationalists would not
hold back from muting all dissenting voices, not just those of the SACP. This made
conditions more favourable for an ANC/SACP alliance.
By 1928 The Communist Party began to entertain notions of working with the
ANC in order to bring about the fall of capitalism. It was during this year that the
Communist International ' s Executive Committee suggested to the CPSA that a united
front between white and African workers was not a realistic possibility. The Executive
Committee proposed that the CPSA had to accept that South Africa' s race problems took
precedence over Marxist ideology of class conflict. This suggestion created internal
debates within the Communist Party that lasted until the mid-1930s. However, by the end
of these conflicts, the CPSA had accepted the Executive Committee' s proposal that the
Communist Party should focus on creating an independent republic in South Africa
through a democratic revolution.
The Nationalist electoral victory in 1948 cemented the ANC/CPSA alliance;
however, by this time there was no need for a communist takeover of the ANC, nor was
such a thing a realistic possibility. By the 1950s, the ANC was led in large part by the
Youth League, which was an educated group of African national liberation fighters who
were strongly opposed to Marxism. Furthermore, the Communist Party was severely
weakened due to its internal class-race conflicts. A great deal of the CPSA's membership
had been reduced as a result of this infighting. By 1950, the CPSA was banned by the
Nationalist government. Therefore, for communists to remain politically relevant in
South Africa, they had to operate through the ANC . The Communist Party would not risk
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losing its only lifeline to political relevancy by attempting to control the ANC. Thus the
CPSA was willing to place its Marxist ideology on hold and become the AN C' s junior
partner until African national liberation could be achieved.
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